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The focus of evolutionary economics is a process of continuous economic and 
organizational change. Currently there is no agreement on the explanation of 
economic evolution. Rather there are competing interpretations.  
To achieve a common understanding of economic evolution, from the perspective of 
the history of economic thought, at first the theoretical approaches of Schumpeter 
and Marshall with regard to economic development or evolution are dealt with. 
After that, a concept of socio-economic evolution in broad agreement with evolution 
in nature is elaborated. It is summed up in the version of a generalized Darwinism. 
In this, evolution is seen as a process of change that leads to the adaptation of 
complex systems, the result of the causal interaction among variation, selection and 
retention of variety.  
As a (slightly) different interpretation the presently predominating approach of neo-
Schumpeterian evolutionary economics is presented. It has gained wide application 
to the theory of innovation and later - based on Penrose - to resource-based theories 
of the firm. In this the dynamic process of the creation and exploitation of resources, 
mainly knowledge, turns out to be the centre of attention of an evolutionary theory 
of the firm.  
Keywords:  Economic evolution, Schumpeter and Marshall, Generalized 
Darwinism, Evolutionary theory of the firm 
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1. Introduction 
A couple of recent survey articles concerning evolutionary economics emphasize 
that an agreement on the explanation of economic evolution is still missing (see i.a. 
Hodgson 1996, p. 699; Fagerberg 2003, p. 127; Witt 2004, pp. 125; 2008, p. 547). 
But there is an almost common consent in that the directed, continuous generation of 
economic change, resulting in the adaptation of the economic system, is the focus of 
interest. However, there are controversial opinions on the explanation of economic 
evolution (see Nelson 2006, p. 492; 2007, pp. 74). A first school of thought, first of 
all, derives characteristic features for structuring the economic process inductively. 
Following a preconception of evolutionary change, basic building blocks are the 
heterogeneity of individual units within a population, the constant emergence of 
novelty, its selection in dependency on its adaptability to the environment and the 
retention of attributes of the units in the passage of time. In addition, the behaviour 
of individual and collective agents is characterized by bounded rationality with 
regard to their information and competences (for that see for instance Metcalfe 2005, 
p. 394; Silverberg, Verspagen 2005, p. 516; Dosi, Marengo 2007, p. 492). A second 
school assumes that from the outset the explanation can be carried out in loose 
accordance with these basic principles of evolution in biology. As founding authors 
of an evolutionary theory of economic change (among others) Veblen, Marshall, 
Schumpeter, Hayek are to be named. In the narrow economic delimitation 
Schumpeter and Marshall are of particular importance. Within the framework of 
their economic analysis they deal with economic development as a relationship 
between stability and routine behaviour on the one hand and innovation and change 
on the other hand. On the central importance of innovation activities, in addition the 
behaviour patterns of firms as the basic unit of evolution, the currently predominant 
evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter (1982) can be found. It has become 
indicative also for the microeconomic foundation of evolutionary economics with its 
main areas of application - besides the theory of economic change and innovation 
activity - also of the theory of the firm and Schumpeterian competition (see Nelson, 
Winter 2002, p. 25). Veblen is assigned to the older American Institutionalism. For 
him economic development consists of a succession of institutional regimes. Hayek 
refers to the more comprehensive sphere of cultural evolution. In accordance with 
that, social institutions like markets are the result of an evolutionary process of the 
origin of a variety of individual human actions and rule-based behaviour as well as 
their selection. But they are neither the outcome of a planned human design nor of 
natural evolution, regardless of human action. They result in a spontaneous order of 
the economy and the society, among others in the form of the division of labour and 
knowledge, in the tradition of Adam Smith.   3
To establish evolutionary economics from the perspective of the history of economic 
thought, at first the theoretical approaches of Schumpeter and Marshall concerning 
the content and the explanation of economic development (or evolution) are dealt 
with. (2.). After that, a comprehensive concept of economic evolution following 
evolution in nature is elaborated. It is critically summed up in the variant of a 
generalized Darwinism. The focus of interest of Nelson and Winter and their more 
applied neo-Schumpeterian version of evolutionary economics is the industry level 
regarded as a population of heterogeneous firms, but also their internal structure and 
competences (3.). Besides the studies to technical and economic change, the 
evolutionary research program has recently shown a close link to the resource-based 
theory and in extension the capability approach to the theory of the firm (Dosi, 
Sylos-Labini 2007, p. 337) (4.). Concluding remarks complete this essay (5.). 
2.  Generic Approaches to Evolutionary Economics: Schumpeter and 
Marshall 
2.1  Schumpeter and the Process of Creative Destruction 
For Schumpeter the theory of economic development is composed of the economic 
statics (the circular flow), the economic dynamics (economic development) as 
“theoretical apparatuses” (1934, p. 82) and the economic sociology. The latter deals 
with the given institutional framework of the economy and its changes that 
influences economic development
1 (see Schumpeter 1954a, p. 21; also Shionoya 
1997, p. 7; Arena, Dangel-Hagnauer  2002, p. 3). These different areas of social life, 
each of them showing a development of their own, are linked with each other and 
lead to an indivisible social process (see Schumpeter 2006/1912, p. 1, 545; also 
Mathews 2007, p. 92). The circular flow as the stationary state of an economy is an 
abstraction, “…but only for the purpose of exhibiting the essence of what actually 
happens” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 9). It shows a tendency towards equilibrium as an 
actual force in case of a change in the economic data. Economic variables fluctuate 
around their normal values (ibid. 1939, p. 70). The development (or evolution) of the 
economy within the given institutional and historical frame of the capitalist 
economic system is the result of the new combination of productive factors in 
different forms (ibid., p. 84; also 1934, p. 66). “… (T)he different employment of the 
economic system’s existing supplies of productive means…” (1934, p. 68) that 
breaks the experience and the routine activities of the stationary state (ibid., p. 80), 
constitutes the core of his vision of a long-term economic process (see Elliott 1983, 
                                                 
1 “…economic analysis deals with the questions how people behave at any time and what the 
economic effects are they produce by so behaving; economic sociology deals with the question how 
they came to behave as they do” (Schumpeter 1954a, p. 21).    4
p. 278). Routine-based behaviour is nearly rational behaviour that results from a 
long-term adjustment and learning process. A vision always precedes the analytical 
research (see Schumpeter 1954a, p. 41). Schumpeter describes the theory of growth 
and development of the classical economists as “the theory of the organic growth of 
the economy” (2006/1912, p. 474). Development is the result of the growth of 
population and capital accumulation accompanied by a rise of demand. After an 
impulse by exogenous forces the growth process follows a deterministic course of 
adaptation.  
According to Schumpeter, economic development is a consequence of technical and 
organizational innovations from a stream of inventions and their following diffusion. 
Inventions and innovations constitute different social processes. They require 
different personal abilities. “The inventor produces ideas, the innovator ‘gets things 
done’…” (ibid. 1947, p. 152; also 1934, p. 88). Innovations do not happen 
simultaneously by all enterprises, resulting in their differentiated growth, from that 
also of industries. They are carried out mainly by newly established enterprises, 
occur discontinuously and in swarms and transform the existing economic structure 
“…by its own initiative, from within” (1934, p. 63). Furthermore, they are not only 
the secondary cause of manufacturing activities, but rather require an agent, an 
entrepreneur as a man who achieves his goal in economic matters deliberately. The 
entrepreneur is the vehicle of innovations, he is the centre of attention in the “Theory 
of Economic Development.” Entrepreneurship means social leadership (1934, p. 84) 
but not private ownership of the means of production and the calculations of costs 
and returns. “The changes in the economic process brought about by innovation, 
together with all their effects, and the response to them by the economic system, we 
shall designate by the term Economic Evolution” (ibid. 1939, p. 86). The creative 
response to entrepreneurial activities as an internal factor of change consists in the 
inclusion of their results into the economic system by imitators and its adaptation to 
the new things created (ibid., p. 137). So evolution is regarded as a path-dependent, 
discontinuous process, determined by its starting point and its course (ibid. 1934, p. 
64). The financing of new combinations is carried out by creation of money and 
bank credit through the existing banking system that detects successful 
entrepreneurs. Assuming full employment of productive resources, the new 
combination has to withdraw the required means of production from existing 
combinations (ibid. 1934, p. 71). In this way it gives rise to a process of creative 
destruction. So innovations as creative actions, entrepreneurs as agents of change, 
and credit accommodation to the entrepreneurs for carrying out innovations are the 
determining factors of economic evolution not existing in the stationary state of an 
economy (see Shionoya 1997, pp. 37; also Gloria-Palermo 2002, p. 25).    5
In a stylized way, the process of economic development or evolution consists of the 
emergence of variety (technical artefacts, products, production processes, behaviour 
patterns, organizational forms) and its selection and diffusion in the markets. It is the 
result of major innovations which mean a change of knowledge, and the following 
adjustment and coordination of resources by allocation activities of imitators as 
followers. These reduce the initial variety. “So the instabilities, which arise from the 
process of innovation, tend to right themselves, and do not go on accumulating” 
(Schumpeter 1928, p. 383).
2 As the result of the permanent stream of inventions and 
innovations, the process of economic development is undetermined and 
characterized also by chance.  
According to the utmost significance of the entrepreneur and also the banker as his 
financier, to Schumpeter - following Carl Menger (Milford 1990, p. 217) - the 
epistemological basis of pure economic analysis is methodological individualism. It 
represents a reductionist way of explanation. In accordance with that, all socio-
economic phenomena are traced back appropriately to individual actions alone. The 
whole must be explained by its given parts. The individuals are the relevant units of 
analysis. But this does not mean to dispute the influence of the environment on 
individual behaviour (see Schumpeter 1908, p. 90 f.). 
Schumpeter did not elaborate a unified theoretical explanation of economic 
dynamics in its different phases. This is the case especially with the origin of 
novelties in a stationary state of the economy. But there is no deterministic reason 
for such an explanation (see Becker et al. 2005, p. 111). He also does not present a 
satisfying theory of entrepreneurial behaviour in a dynamic economy. Expressly, he 
refuses to make use of biological analogies in his theory (see Schumpeter 1954a, p. 
789; 1934, p. 57; about that Arena, Dangel-Hagnauer 2002, pp. 11). Sanderson 
(1990, p. 2) points out that the first two decades of the 20
th century were a “’dark’ 
age for evolutionism”, that period when Schumpeter wrote his “Theory of Economic 
Development.” His most important contribution to economic development is the 
elaboration of the central meaning of internally emerging technical and 
organizational innovations and their diffusion accompanied by a restructuring of 
given productive resources in new combinations. Innovations overcome the 
stationary state of the economy. Starting with Metcalfe from the assumption (1998, 
p. 36 f.; 2005, p. 396) that the creation and directed selection of variety within a 
population, driven by competition and scarcity of resources, constitute the basic 
principles of economic development, then Schumpeter, with his theory of launching 
and disseminating technical and economic innovations by entrepreneurs (variational 
                                                 
2   “…one could understand Being only by simultaneously understanding its Order and Motion” 
(Stolper 1951, p. 176).   6
change), their self-organisation and selection under competitive conditions and their 
internal development leading in turn to new varieties (transformational or 
developmental change), provides a broadly orientated economic contribution to a 
non-biological evolutionary theory of economic change.
3 
2.2  Marshall and the Process of Gradual Economic Change 
Schumpeter’s theory of economic development represents a deliberate alternative to 
the value theory of Marshall. The subject of this is the analysis of demand and 
supply as the fundamental idea, assuming given technological conditions and 
preferences, and the derivation of the normal values of economic variables in the 
long run. But the method of static analysis is only the starting point of economic 
analysis. It describes a situation of order of economic relations.
4 It is not suitable for 
dealing with the economic development of industries (see Marshall 1961, p. 461). 
Another part of Marshall’s theoretical structure is a theory of production and 
economic change by means of technical innovations. Characteristic features of 
production (ibid., pp. 314) are the existence of internal and external economies, 
which are the result of the division of labour in individual firms and between them 
and the specialization of the managerial and entrepreneurial function respectively as 
well as the level of industrial production, also the conception of the organic, 
irreversible life cycle for the growth of the firm. From an organic point of view they 
serve as the basis for his “Entwicklungsdenken” (evolution-mindness) (Schumpeter 
1954b, p. 287) and his confidence in economic and social progress. Based on Adam 
Smith, economic development is produced and driven by increasing returns in 
production, extensions of the markets, accumulation of the firm’s internal and 
external knowledge and management competences, in the end free competition (see 
Marshall 1961, p. 461). It is the core of this explanation of the dynamics of the 
economic process to combine standardization and routine of firms on the one hand 
and innovation, change and creativity on the other hand by means of the principle of 
continuity (see Raffaelli 2003, p. IX). The motto of the “Principles”: “Natura non 
facit saltum” (Nature does not make a leap) is the symbol of this principle. 
Economic change is the result of a multitude of minor innovations on the part of a 
large number of small firms, but not a small number of enterprises and major 
innovations (see Spengler 1959, pp. 8; Lowe 1975, p. 419).  
                                                 
3 “Nothing to do with biology per se, but everything to do with evolution” (Metcalfe 2005, p. 421).-
“Schumpeter was an evolutionary thinker through and through” (Mathews 2007, p. 86). 
4   „Evolution is not possible without a substrate of order to give guidance and purpose to change” 
(Metcalfe 2007, p. 99).   7
In the preface of the “Principles” (p. XIV) Marshall’s programmatic statement can 
be found regarding the question whether economic and technical change shows 
similarity to evolution in nature: “The Mecca of economists lies in economic biology 
rather than in economic dynamics.” As the result of his confidence in a progressive 
economic and social development, it refers - following Spencer rather than Darwin - 
to the general rule that the shape of higher living things and the structure of social 
and economic activities in the process of development are characterized by a 
growing differentiation of their functions and at the same time a closer integration 
between their single parts (transformational evolution) (see Marshall 1961, p. 241). 
The division of labour and the origin and application of knowledge in enterprises at 
the same time produce a growing functional differentiation of industrial and social 
activities and individual competences as the further division of labour and mass 
production. They also lead to a closer coordination and integration of their 
individual parts through firms and their different organizational forms like, for 
example, the use of and a higher need for coordinating managerial activities (ibid., p. 
241). Both consequences occur intentionally. The growth of knowledge and its use 
are the most important productive factors, but also the basic reasons for economic 
change. Knowledge is a component of capital and requires coordination and 
organization in enterprises (ibid., pp. 138)
5. These are different with respect to their 
state of knowledge and the management capacity of the active individuals with the 
result of their heterogeneity (ibid., pp. 311). They realize their economic 
opportunities to a different degree. The managerial competences contribute to their 
differentiated internal development with respect to the efficiency of the production 
process that combines knowledge and organization.  
In the course of its life cycle, the growth of a firm is limited internally by a decrease 
of its managerial and organizational abilities and the market entries of new 
competitors (”And as with the growth of trees, so it was with the growth of 
businesses as a general rule…”; ibid., p. 316). The diversity of firm growth is the 
precondition of being subject to market selection corresponding to the principles of 
substitution (ibid., p. 341). “The tendency to variation is a chief cause of 
progress…” (p. 355). Metcalfe (2007, p. 81, 100) characterizes the evolutionary 
process as a succession of de-coordinating forces of change through innovation 
activities and following coordinating adjustment processes in markets (“…the self 
transforming as well as the self organizing nature of capitalism.”). To summarize, 
according to this, evolution means a process of the internal development of firms 
because of the progressive division of labour and increasing returns (development 
                                                 
5   „Knowledge is our most powerful engine of production; it enables us to subdue Nature and to 
force her to satisfy our wants. Organization aids knowledge; it has many forms,…” (Marshall 
1961, p. 138).   8
view), but also the emergence and diffusion of technical and economic novelties and 
their selection in the market process (variational view) (ibid., pp. 86). So Marshall 
used the population method regarding both the efficiency of enterprises and their 
ability to innovate and grow (ibid., p. 94). Looking at both the theories of value and 
of production, for Marshall there exist a combination in the correspondence of the 
economy with mechanics (market) and biology (enterprises) (see Niman 1991, pp. 
28).  
Despite the frequent use of metaphors from biology in his analysis of the industrial 
organization of the economy, Marshall did not outline a unified theory of economic 
development (Clark, Juma 1988, pp. 199; Hodgson 1993, p. 406; Roncaglia 2001, p. 
383). For Schumpeter (1954a, p. 836), the “Principles” as his fundamental work are 
“strictly static”,
6 not dynamically orientated, even if for Marshall “…the central idea 
of economics…must be that of living force and movement” (p. XV). But 
Schumpeter concedes that Marshall “…understood the working of the capitalist 
process…He sensed the intimate organic necessities of economic life even more 
intensively than he formulated them…” (ibid. 1954a, p. 836). Marshall’s interest in 
biology and evolution arises from the difficulty in integrating time into economic 
analysis satisfactorily, but also the realized limitation of the static analysis with 
respect to the theory of the firm and the value theory as a whole (see Groenewegen 
2003, p. 243). Conceptions from biology are more complex than the ones from 
mechanics. Like Schumpeter he deals with the level of the individual firm, but also 
its internal development with respect to the given potential in the life cycle. From his 
leading ideas of change and evolution by means of a continuous interaction between 
innovation and the following routinization, Raffaelli (2003, p. 141) infers: “All 
things considered, maybe he was closer to the Mekka than he himself was able to 
realize.” 
In Schumpeter’s and Marshall’s view, the starting point of economic analysis is a 
condition of order and rest of the economy. Both authors agree that the static 
economic theory has to be broadened. Influenced by the ‘Younger’ German 
historical school, they are governed by the ideas of the historical development of 
human society and the unity of social phenomena (see Schumpeter 1954a, pp. 809; 
also Shionoya, Nishizawa 2008, p. 3). In their common opinion economic 
development or evolution is a process of the endogenously emerging self-
transformation of different economic activities. It results from technical and 
organizational novelties, and with that set off economic adjustment processes in 
                                                 
6   “This does not prevent him from dealing with evolutionary phenomena or indeed any phenomena 
of economic life that are refractory to the application of the methods of statics” (Schumpeter 
1954a, p. 836).    9
markets. They are the consequences of innovation activities of entrepreneurs, but 
also the side effects of the production process based on the cumulatively occurring 
division of labour. For both of them management and entrepreneurship are important 
causes of economic development. Technical and economic changes go off both 
gradually (Marshall) and discontinuously (Schumpeter) (see Awan 1986, pp. 44; 
Mokyr 1990, pp. 90). They are mutually dependent. Between these extreme cases 
there is a continuum of technical changes. The discontinuous and the gradual 
approach to technical and economic change may be combined into a Schumpeter-
Marshall model of economic development (see Andersen 1997, pp. 123). Both 
developmental patterns result in a diversity of small and large-scale firms, subject to 
market competition with regard to their internal growth and chance of survival. 
3  Evolution in Nature and Society: Fact, Subject and Theory 
3.1  Fundamentals of Biological Evolution 
In general, evolution comprises a process of growth, coordination, exploitation and 
diffusion of new information and knowledge in different forms that results in 
continuous change (see Hermann-Pillath 2002, p. 22; Loasby 2002, p. 1231). 
Knowledge is always incomplete, available only scattered and subject to error. Its 
growth is the result epistemologically of conjectures and refutations, the selection of 
individual hypotheses (see Popper 1972, p. 261). But the growth of knowledge also 
consists of a history of competing research programmes which as a consequence of 
inertia more likely happen continuously (see Lakatos 1970, p. 155). Learning 
activities mainly in the surrounding of existing knowledge in a self-perpetuating 
process increase the knowledge base.  
To elaborate a general frame of explaining the reality of evolution that also takes 
into consideration the peculiarities of socio-economic evolution, a concept will be 
worked out in loose similarity with the basic principles of Neo-Darwinism as the 
dominating theory of evolution in biology. In this field the evolutionary logic is 
composed in detail. And there are also reasons for the assumption that economic and 
biological evolution, in general terms, share some common features like 
heterogeneity of individuals, with that population thinking, the creation and selection 
of novelties and the retention of their forms and attributes. This attempt must rest 
upon observable empirical regularities of economic and social change. “Social 
evolution should be consistent with and not contradictory to what we know about 
biological evolution” (Knudsen 2002, p. 467).    10
Individual mechanisms of a neo-Darwinian theory of evolution
7 as a heuristic frame 
are the existence and at the same time the emergence of an infinite variety among 
the individuals of a species, their advantage or disadvantage inside the population of 
non-identical but similar units concerning the survival and reproduction by means of 
natural selection and the retention of selected individual characteristics for future 
generations (“A blind-variation-and-selective-retention process…”; Campbell 1960, 
p. 380; 1974, p. 421; comparable Hermann-Pillath 2002, pp. 206). The interactions 
among the Darwinian mechanisms constitute a causal explanation of adaptive 
change. So evolution first of all requires variety, but it both produces and destroys it. 
A diversity of organisms as the individuals of biological systems comes out of 
spontaneously occurring mutations, and more frequently a recombination of genes as 
the carrier of information and novelty. Both take place in an undirected way, 
regardless of the need of the organisms (see Mayr 1991, pp. 124). The genotype as 
the totality of genetic information comprises the “potential” of an organism, while 
the phenotype, its outside appearance, represents the “realization” of this potential 
(see Faber, Proops 1991, p. 63). A single entity shows a deterministic internal 
development. But the genotype does not react upon the phenotype, so that the 
genetic information is preserved unchanged. In general, concerning the distinction 
between genotype and phenotype as units of evolution, the one between replicator 
and interactor has come in useful (see Hull 1988, p. 408; Brandon 1998, pp. 177). 
The former transmits its characteristic features nearly consistently and repeatedly to 
the units of a population (unit of transmission). The latter interacts with the 
environment in such a way that this interrelation causes differences in the replication 
(process of transmission).  
The natural selection of organisms with regard to the way they interact with the 
environment leads to a flow out of the gene pool. Those attributes of the entities that 
are best adapted to given environmental conditions are retained. They become the 
basis for further evolution. In that way continuity over time is guaranteed. The 
selection process results in the reproductive superiority of an organism, thereby the 
directed variation of the relative frequency of phenotypes inside a population 
(Darwin’s “one long argument”). It does not go off purposefully, but 
opportunistically as well as coincidentally. The continual adaptation of the 
organisms and the stability of a population result from the competition for survival 
and differential growth in the face of an “overproduction” of organic variety and 
limitation of natural resources, but not through the initial balance of nature. 
Selection is effective if there exists a difference in the variety of individuals of all 
kind, until no further change in the structure of the population is to be expected (see 
                                                 
7   For the foundation of Neo-Darwinism see Mayr 1984, pp. 454; Depew, Weber 1995, pp. 299.   11
Depew, Weber 1995, pp. 36; Metcalfe 1998, p. 139). It is effective as a creative 
power in evolution only in that case (see Gould 2002, p. 139) when the variety is 
limited and the accumulation of preferred subsets of a population takes place slowly 
and steadily, but not rapidly. Gradualism and population thinking are linked to each 
other. But gradualism does not imply any opinion concerning the speed of evolution 
(see Mayr 1994, p. 71). Evolution may run at a variable rate, depending on the 
stability of environmental conditions, whereas the genetic mechanism is the same in 
all variations. To sum up, evolution in biology is the result of a two-stage process. It 
comprises the emergence and the selection of genetic variety and thereby leads to a 
guided change within a population. The outcome is a dynamic equilibrium between 
adapted individuals and the environment.  
For the formation of his theory of evolution, Darwin took up basic elements of 
English Political Economy. It was this theory of natural selection of organic variety 
as an external force of evolution that dominates when compared to the internal 
developmental driving forces of an organism, leading to its stability and balance, 
which he derived from Malthus’ law of population as a natural force (see Schweber 
1980, pp. 195; Kohn 1980, pp. 140). Using the principles of diversity and 
individualism to explain social and biological phenomena, he cited reasons for the 
advantages of increasing division of labour and the specialization in growing 
markets, just like those of regularity and order, which originate without intention or 
conscious design in the intended interactions of individual activities (see Schweber 
1977, p. 280). So, for Darwin, classical Political Economy was a branch of 
evolutionary biology (see Schweber 1980, p. 212; Depew, Weber 1995, p. 2). 
Neither the invisible hand of Adam Smith nor Darwin’s natural selection is directed 
by a rational individual or by intention. Both the neoclassical conception of the 
world of economics as well as the Darwinian conception of the world of biology rest 
on Newton’s model of the balance of opposing forces.
8 They reduce complex 
phenomena to a sum of simple roots whose interactions determine the course of the 
events. Competition and selection are central forces of adjustment and balance in the 
economy and in biology as well, as much as the importance of gravity is to physics 
(see Depew, Weber 1995, p. 9).  
3.2  Similarity between Nature and the Social World? 
                                                 
8   „Darwin was applying the highly prized Newtonian models…bringing evolutionary theory, for the 
first time, into the conceptual orbit of respectable British thinking. This was done by portraying 
the world of nature as very like the world as political economists saw it” (Depew, Weber 1995, p. 
71). – “Darwin had transformed the generalised entrepreneurial ethos of English life into a 
biological theory which, in turn, derived much of its support from these all-pervasive cultural 
commitments” (Brown 1996, p. 543).   12
3.2.1 Conception 
To put forward an evolutionary theory of economic change following the neo-
Darwinian theory of evolution in biology, both functional counterparts in the 
economic sphere for all evolutionary mechanisms and for entities which for the 
purpose of a causal explanation of change correspond to the genotype (or replicator) 
and phenotype (or interactor) in nature must be found. In this way this approach 
goes beyond the previously assumed non-Darwinian variation-selection version of 
evolutionary change. Reasoning by analogy, one form of similarity between 
scientific disciplines, is a method to build new hypotheses. It transfers elements of 
different kinds such as theories or research methods which show a similar causal 
meaning or characteristics among scientific disciplines (see Cohen 1993, p. 13). 
Metaphors, however, as a different and weaker form of similarity between natural 
and social science do not show any explanatory substance. But this term is also used 
in a different form, from time to time also as a synonym for analogy (ibid., p. 35). 
The Darwinian mechanisms, however - if at all - will only represent a general frame 
for explaining many processes of change in the social world (see Hodgson, Knudsen 
2006a, p. 15; Nelson 2006, p. 509). They will not alone be able to explain the 
evolutionary process of the economy in its entirety. Concerning the details, the 
constituting evolutionary mechanisms have to be completed through specific 
economic hypotheses (see Hodgson 2002, p. 270).
9 So a close structural 
correspondence between two disciplines and the form of the evolutionary 
mechanisms need not exist (see Niman 1994, p. 372; Dosi, Nelson 1994, p. 155; 
Nelson 2006, p. 493). 
Concerning the units of selection, information, practical and scientific knowledge, 
individual skills and behavioural rules of the market participants for productive 
activities, in general, resources of different kinds, may fulfil the functional 
significance of genes. They are selected for application and diffusion in the form of 
technical artefacts, production engineering, organizational forms in firms and 
markets as phenotypes on a competitive basis. The selected techniques and 
behaviour patterns will be preserved and transmitted, through internal growth of 
existing and the market entries of new firms. Criterion of the selection is the 
adaptability of the unit, in case of the enterprise the level of production costs, the 
technical effectiveness, the benefits of the customers (see Nelson 2005, p. 467). 
Besides individual units also phenomena above the individual level like firms, 
organizations and institutions have a meaning of their own. They are the result of the 
                                                 
9   Regarding different views concerning the meaning of Neo-Darwinism for explaining evolution in 
economics, see Witt 2004, pp. 127; 2008, pp. 554.   13
interaction between individual activities and aggregate regularities. Selection takes 
place on many stages as a hierarchical process. Evolutionary economics does not 
follow methodological individualism. Instead it is non-reductionistically orientated 
(see Vromen 2004, p. 233; Castellacci 2007, p. 588).  
3.2.2 Critique 
Now, there are important differences between evolution in nature and an 
evolutionary explanation of socio-economic change, mainly regarding the 
emergence and reduction of variety as evolutionary mechanisms. “In detail, 
biological and socio-economic evolution are very different” (Hodgson 2002, p. 272; 
also Hodgson, Knudsen 2006a, p. 14; Nelson 2006, p. 493). To begin with, novelties 
in economics and society come into being not only by chance, but also to a high 
degree intentionally and for a specific purpose. They are based on past experience. 
They are a means of individuals and firms to adapt voluntarily to their environment 
or even to change it, by introducing new products, production methods and/or 
organizational forms (see among others Ramstad 1994, pp. 83; Mc Kelvey 1996, p. 
22; Cordes 2006, pp. 533; Castellacci 2007, p. 602). An evolutionary theory of 
economic change comprises “…’blind’ and ‘deliberate’ processes. Indeed, in human 
problem solving itself, both elements are involved and difficult to disentangle” 
(Nelson, Winter 1982, p. 11; also Vanberg 1996, p. 690). But the result also of a 
deliberate variation, as in the form of innovations, even if not the search for it, is 
characterized in all phases by uncertainty or even chance in respect to their technical 
and market consequences (see Cziko 1995, pp. 288; Vromen 2004, p. 233; Nelson 
2006, p. 500). Internal entrepreneurial activities are accompanied by external effects 
of the environment, together influencing evolutionary change.  
Selection of technical and economic variety is, aside from environmental pressure, 
also the result of foresighted human activities. It allows to change individual 
attributes and to take into account the long-running consequences of current 
decisions. The unit of selection modifies its relative frequency within its population 
by adapting to the environment, at the same time it develops internally as a result of 
selection pressure. Both forms of selection, the artificial and the natural one, have in 
common the retention of those individuals that are adapted to the environment and 
the elimination of those that cannot adapt. Selection is a universal method that takes 
effect in case of alternatives on the external and the internal sphere. The internal 
selection moderates external selection (see Geisendorf 2004, p. 89). As a result of 
that, novelties in the field of economics will occur less coincidentally than in the 
natural world.    14
Furthermore, in socio-economic evolution, learning, training, acquired knowledge 
are able to transmit information and experience over time. This way the knowledge 
base of individuals and enterprises will grow steadily. But new productive 
knowledge must be created and acquired intentionally. So the process of socio-
economic evolution also takes place in accordance with the evolutionary model of 
Lamarck (see Nelson, Winter 1982, p. 11: Saviotti, Metcalfe 1991, p. 36; Hodgson 
2001, p. 114; Knudsen 2001, p. 144). According to that variant, evolution is an 
exclusively vertical phenomenon: the continuous internal development of an 
organism or a routine, or a technical artefact in the direction of higher complexity 
and perfection in adaptation to environmental demand. At the same time the 
retention of acquired features passes to the next generation through transmission. 
There exists a reciprocal stream of information between the interactor and the 
replicator that modifies the latter. Variety is the result of adaptation to the external 
environment, for Darwin, however, it is both a precondition and the result of 
variation and selection. All in all, the evolutionary mechanisms are interdependent 
more than independent from one another, because human behaviour is goal-directed 
(see Cordes 2006, p. 538). 
Against this background concerning the possible correspondence between biological 
and economic evolution, serious objections are raised. Witt (i.a. 1999, p. 295) comes 
to the following conclusion: “…in the domain of economics, there is no structure 
comparable in its continuity with the genetic mechanisms that have led to the 
emergence of species in nature.” Evolution for him means a systematic, irreversible 
change of a system in time. It is the outcome of the self-transformations of complex 
systems through the origin and diffusion of novelty in different form resulting in 
qualitative changes of its elements (see Witt 2001, p. 49; 2004, p. 130). The three 
Darwinian principles do not play a part in explaining evolution. So the idea of self-
transformation allows a variety of theoretical approaches outside biology. In this - 
compared to the neo-Darwinian approach - restricted interpretation the evolutionary 
economic process is characterized by means of the simultaneous effect of de-
coordinating or self-reinforcing and coordinating or self-regulating forces of the 
market (see Witt 1985, p. 583; 1997, p. 496). Comparable to Schumpeter and 
Marshall, both forces of change from within resulting from new knowledge and its 
diffusion (differentiation) as well as of adaptation (integration) determine the 
economic process. Cultural, with this economic change results - following Hayek - 
unintentionally out of individual human actions, which at the same time generate 
new knowledge, but without human plan and interventions by a government. The 
result of the evolutionary process is not foreseeable, undetermined.    15
The central requirement of evolutionary economic change, also interpreted as a self-
transformation process, is the emergence and diffusion of knowledge-based 
novelties (ibid. 1987, p. 9). They come into being endogenously by entrepreneurs 
who react to technical opportunities or necessary adjustments if the performance of 
the market is not adequate. Then, principles of explaining economic evolution are 
the existence and creation, selection and retention of individual variety inside a 
population and the development (or transformation) of single entities, both leading 
to a new economic structure. With this comprehensive interpretation it has to be 
considered that developing units, too, are subject to selection in order to find out 
which ones may survive in the competition of the markets (see Hodgson 2002, p. 
265; Hodgson, Knudsen 2006a, p. 8). That is why there is no inconsistency between 
both conceptions of variation and transformation in economic evolution. They rather 
complement one another. But the ideas of a possible self-organisation of individual 
units and self-transformation of a system do not include a unified theoretical frame 
for explaining economic and organizational change and their adaptation to the 
environment compared to a broadly interpreted variation-selection approach of Neo-
Darwinism.  
3.2.3 Generalized  Darwinism 
Despite the quoted differences in the basic mechanisms of evolution, especially the 
role of chance and intention in case of the emergence and selection of novelties, 
there is, ontologically, common ground concerning the view of the structure of 
reality in nature and the social world, with that also in the economy. It refers to 
population thinking that comprises as a general framework the mechanisms of 
evolution by variation, selection and retention (see Aldrich et al. 2008, p. 582).
10 
Therefore, the neo-Darwinian approach to evolutionary economics will be kept up in 
its essence. Economic evolution is both distinguished in the way that acquired 
characteristics are transmitted between replicator and interactor (see Fleck 2000, p. 
265; Hodgson 2001. p. 114; Knudsen 2001, p. 144; Hodgson, Knudsen 2006b, p. 
346; Buenstorf 2006, p. 514). In economics Darwinian evolution by way of variation 
of a population is accompanied by Lamarckian evolution through the transmission of 
acquired features over time. They do not exclude each other like in biology. The 
latter is also compatible with a more intentional behaviour of individuals and 
organisations. Through self-organisation of individuals by interaction of the units of 
selection leading to self-intensifying effects besides chance and selection, new 
structures may arise. The neo-Darwinian theory of evolution will as well explain that 
                                                 
10  „.., as long as there is a population within which entities display variation in the acquisition of 
characteristics vital to survival, then Darwinian evolution will occur“ (Aldrich et al. 2008, p. 585).   16
only acquired advantageous attributes are transmitted and retained, also results of 
self-organizing and self-transforming processes as additional mechanisms, but the 
unfavourable ones are selected. It is at the same time the more detailed and 
comprehensive theory especially outside biology (see Dawkins 1998, pp. 20; 
Hodgson 2001, p. 98, 117; 2003, pp. 360). For this theoretical view the term 
“Universal” or recently “ Generalized Darwinism” has been coined. It represents 
both a general, bridging principle that applies to complex population systems, as 
well as a monistic unlike a dualistic concept of evolution. In accordance with the 
latter, nature and the social world form mutually dependent spheres of reality (see 
Witt 2008, p. 559; Aldrich et al. 2008, p. 593).
11 This wide interpretation comes 
close to Nelson’s demand: “…I would like to urge a broad and flexible view of 
evolutionary theories of change” (2006, p. 509).  
3.2.4 Neo-Schumpeterian Evolutionary Economics 
The subject of evolutionary economics in the currently most widely held version of 
Nelson and Winter - in correspondence to the previous definition - is the description 
and explanation of technical and economic change in enterprises and industries, 
especially the discovery and diffusion of technical novelties based on experience and 
new knowledge, and its selection on the level of enterprises. Forces of inertia retain 
continuity in that respect which individual and collective characteristics will survive 
the selection process and disseminate (see Dosi, Nelson 1994, pp. 154; Nelson 1995, 
p. 56). With regard to the meaning of technical and economic development both 
authors categorize their evolutionary approach as “Neo-Schumpeterian” (Nelson, 
Winter 1982, p. 39). Following the characterization of Witt (2008, p. 556), neo-
Schumpeterian evolutionary economics describes a dualistic concept of evolution. 
According to this, biological and economic evolution constitute two separate and 
independent processes of reality. By emphasizing the gradual course of economic 
change and the management activities of firms they also find themselves in the 
tradition of Marshall (see Loasby 1989, p. 56; Foss 1997, p. 79; Roncaglia 2001, p. 
382; Raffaelli 2003, p. 54). In contrast to Schumpeter and Marshall, besides the 
individual firm, they do not only look at the market level, but also at its internal 
organization and the role of institutions for innovation activities. The assumed 
difference between generalized Darwinism as a monistic and Neo-Schumpeterian 
evolutionary economics as a dualistic variant is hardly significant. According to 
                                                 
11  „It is in the universal process of variation, differential fitness and heritability, transmission of 
selected variants and their combination of new variants that we have ‚universal Darwinism.’ 
These are the processes that define a ‚Darwinian machine’ “ (Plotkin 1994, p. 86). – For this 
concept see extensively Hodgson 2002, pp. 269; 2003, pp. 368; Hodgson, Knudsen 2004, pp. 283; 
Aldrich et al. 2008.    17
Witt, it results from a different attitude concerning the structure of reality with 
regard to change in nature and the social world and is “..part of the researcher’s 
informal world view…” (Witt 2008, pp. 551). They have in common - even if 
differently strict - the foundation following the neo-Darwinian principles. But the 
latter has less the intention to develop a complete model that is consistent with the 
framework of Neo-Darwinism. At present the neo-Schumpeterian approach 
predominates among the differing interpretations of evolutionary economics (ibid., 
p. 571). It gained broad application particularly in the theory of innovation and later 
the theory of the firm. For Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 18), the industry and its 
development are in the forefront of their analysis, which is a population of firms. It 
is less their intention to construct an original theory of the firm. These are 
characterized only in so far as they are used for the analysis of an industry. Their 
moulding of the firm represents an attempt to combine corresponding elements of 
Schumpeter and Marshall with each other. Against that the generalized Darwinism is 
a still unfinished research project (see Aldrich et al. 2008, p. 581). So in the 
following a neo-Schumpeterian interpretation of economic evolution and firm 
behaviour will be pursued.  
4.  Towards an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm 
4.1 Routine-Based  Theory 
Nelson and Winter consider firms as goal-oriented, purposefully behaving 
organizations of individual activities. They are, above all, carriers of production 
techniques and production knowledge. The process of manufacturing (in the 
tradition of Marshall) is their focus of interest, but not plain exchange, contractual 
relations or transaction costs.
12 Unlike biological organisms, firms mainly are not 
passive with respect to the environment, but they interact intentionally with it. In the 
course of their internal development they can change their activities and attributes 
when adapting to the environment. Coming from behavioural theories of the firm, 
Nelson and Winter assume the behaviour of intended but limited rationality as well 
as the initial goal to meet an aspiration level (see Simon 1979, pp. 502). They refuse 
the assumption of optimality as a behavioural rule of firms as well as one of perfect 
information. Firms are seen as profit-seeking but not as profit-maximizing 
organizations (see Winter 1988, p. 174). Their stock of private and public 
knowledge, experience and competences are accumulated in the skills and habits of 
individuals and a hierarchy of organizational routines in production, investment, 
                                                 
12  „The fact that incentives are not taken into account is a drawback shared by all the evolutionary 
theories of the firm“ (Garrouste, Saussier 2005, p. 186).   18
search and innovation activities (for this differentiation see Dosi, Nelson, Winter 
2000, p. 5; also Hodgson, Knudsen 2004, pp. 285). Routines that, to a high degree, 
are of local and specific nature constitute an almost rational, i.e consistent behaviour 
of firms, as already emphasized by Schumpeter (1934) with regard to the stationary 
circular flow of the economy.
13 They reduce the uncertainty and facilitate the 
coordination of their information and decision processes. They also increase the 
productivity of their own activities and guarantee continuity and internal stability 
(see Winter 1975, p. 101). Routines need not lead to optimal outcomes, but are best 
adapted to the prevailing environmental situation. “One conclusion from the 
literature review is that the term ‘routine’ refers to a broad range of regularities in 
the economy” (Becker 2004, p. 662).  
For Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 14), skills and habits of individuals and routines of 
organisations have the same functional meaning as genes have as durable units of 
variation in nature, as much as firms are comparable with their phenotypes.
14 As the 
result of the selection both within a firm and among a population of firms, which is a 
hierarchical selection, the share of skills and routines which are successful and 
adapted to the environment will grow. Both forms of selection supplement each 
other and are important in a theory of economic evolution (see Aldrich, Ruef 2006, 
pp. 26). Intended and problem-orientated processes of learning and searching to be 
directed at seeking profits and that occur cumulatively and path dependent (see 
Teece et al. 1994, pp. 11), but also mistakes concerning the replication and the 
combination of routines change existing behavioural routines gradually and with 
delay. Those firms which show a below average level of productivity will shrink and 
have to adapt to the demands of the environment. Those with an above average level 
will gain above average profits and grow if they invest in production capacity and 
innovate with their own financial means (see Winter 1975, p. 105; Witt 1996, p. 
712). The selection pressure against the less efficient enterprises increases. 
Evolutionary change shows economic processes of self-reinforcement.  
The search for novelties of different kinds corresponds to the mutation and 
recombination of genes in the natural world (Nelson, Winter 1982, p. 128). Like 
selection it does not take place exclusively by chance, but also intentionally (see 
Nelson 2006, p. 500). So firms have a causal significance in the process of economic 
evolution. In contrast to optimal adaptation  a variety of routines of firms as well as 
                                                 
13  To treat rational and routine behaviour as equivalent is “…sufficiently near to reality, if things 
have time to hammer logic into men. Where this has happened, and within the limits in which it 
has happened, one may rest content with this fiction and build theories upon it” (p. 80).  
14  Nelson (2006, p. 505) stresses that in many areas of cultural evolution a firm, one sided relation 
between the genotype and the phenotype (or the replicator and interactor) as in biology does not 
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skills and habits of individuals will occur, triggering evolutionary change (see 
Metcalfe 1995, p. 471). According to their specific routines and competences to 
change this kind of behaviour, firms will differ, for instance, in the level of 
production costs, profitability, thereby internal growth. Since they also act 
intentionally, both forms of economic genotypes are less stable than genetic 
information in the natural world. The - intended and not intended - modification of 
routines impedes the exact retention and transmission of knowledge and rules, 
thereby the explanation of stability and persistence of firm behaviour (see Becker 
2004, pp. 662; Buenstorf 2006, pp. 519). This realization gives rise to a critique of a 
Darwinian kind of explanation of economic evolution (as before Witt 1989). In this 
evolutionary understanding, firms are regarded as experience- and knowledge-based 
organizations, capable of learning, or as “repositories of productive knowledge” 
(Winter 1988, p. 175). They are, as a whole, subject to external selection within their 
population of entities, and as a single entity they also show an irregular, internal 
development in order to adapt continually to alterations of the environment. As a 
consequence of gradual and delayed adaptation of behavioural patterns to 
environmental change and of bounded rationality, the evolutionary, behavioural 
approach is not sufficiently capable of explaining new activities like the employment 
of resources for innovation activities. It could not develop a long-term strategy of the 
firm at that time (see Winter 1987, p. 161).  
4.2 Resource-Based  Theories 
In a later stage of development the research program of evolutionary economics 
extends the behavioural approach of the theory of the firm by results of management 
theories concerning business strategy. In accordance with that, firms are 
characterized by their market strategy, internal organisational structure and specific 
competences for the use of their given resources (see Nelson 1991, p. 67). A strategy 
comprises the commitments made by a firm determining its objects, based on its 
given resources, in a dynamic view also the search for, the selection and 
development of carrying out new activities and their exploitation in the production 
process, for instance new technologies and business plans. The structure includes the 
internal organization of an enterprise in order to reach its goals. Both elements 
decide what the core competences of an enterprise are with regard to its goals. They 
change only slowly as the result of bounded rationality and the given hierarchy of 
routines. Competences for a coordinated employment of given resources supplement 
the routine and learning activities. As forms of specific productive knowledge they 
serve as a basis for the intentional development of value creating strategies. 
Knowledge being stored in individuals and organisations is the most important   20
resource of an enterprise. It leads to the formation of competences and is also the 
precondition for the creation of new resources. Strategies are that part of knowledge 
that puts together its individual parts and allows its use it for special purposes and in 
certain areas (see Malerba, Orsenigo 2000, p. 297). Existing competences are the 
result of cumulated entrepreneurial processes of search, learning and innovations, 
also the transfer of knowledge that takes place path dependent, thus irreversible and 
directed. They establish new forms of persistent competitive advantages and 
strenghten the firm’s ability to grow and survive (see Teece, Pisano, Shuen 1997, p. 
515; Teece 2007, p. 1325).  
The creation of new knowledge as an entrepreneurial resource is looked upon as the 
production of an immaterial, original good (see Arrow 1962, p. 614), not only 
embodied in capital or organizations. Knowledge is both the final product of the 
research department of an enterprise, as well as an intermediate product applied to 
increase productivity. It results from internal research and development (R&D) 
carried out in the organizational form of vertical integration, of cooperation with 
competing firms, and of the acquisition and application of external knowledge from 
specialized firms or organisations on secondary markets for knowledge and 
innovations, i.e. universities or research laboratories. But it also comes from the 
experience and learning of employees in manufacturing, therefore the continuous 
improvement of own products and production techniques (see Malerba 1992, pp. 
847; Antonelli 1999, p. 247). Internally explored knowledge leads to high expenses 
and can afterwards either be exploited in-house or sold to competitors. It forms 
intentionally but without knowing its results in advance. External knowledge 
acquisition frequently necessitates lower costs than the creation of internal 
knowledge through R&D expenses. It can also be acquired by chance, 
unintentionally. In both cases the “common pool” of knowledge will increase as a 
basis for positive externalities for its further exploration and exploitation. Its creation 
just like the following innovations are not mainly the activities of an individual 
entrepreneur - as it was for Schumpeter - or a firm. They have increasingly become a 
collective, systemic process in which a lot of private and public participants are 
involved (see i.a. Pyka 2007, p. 370). So cooperation between individual units 
supplements selection as a mechanism of evolution. A lack of divisibility of new 
technical knowledge impedes its transmission among different uses or enterprises 
and says something for the integration of the development and conversion in new 
products and processes in the own enterprises (see Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella 
2001, pp. 95). Economies of scale and scope among research, development and 
production also contribute to this. Moreover, enterprises are able to absorb and apply 
external knowledge only by means of their internal research and development 
activities and their knowledge base. The different sources of new knowledge and   21
innovations are complementary to one another. Firms will probably employ them in 
combination (for different knowledge capacities, see U. Lichtenthaler, E. 
Lichtenthaler 2009, p. 1318). But there has to be a balance between the two sources 
of change, the exploration of new knowledge and its selection and the exploitation 
and retention of existing knowledge and competencies (see March 1991, p. 71). 
From an organizational point of view, each knowledge and innovation strategy will 
be combined with a special business model of a firm.  
Besides market structure and firm size, determining “third” factors of creating new 
knowledge and innovations in-house, as technological opportunities, appropriability 
conditions, market demand, with that the common knowledge base, establish a stable 
technological paradigm or, synonymously, a technological regime (see Nelson, 
Winter 1977, p. 57; Dosi 1988, p. 1127). They constitute a part of the given 
environment for technical novelties and determine their rate and direction. The 
course and the result of the knowledge and innovation process will lead intentionally 
to internal and external learning activities for the next round of knowledge creation 
and have an influence on the selection and application of future techniques. 
Enterprises differ from each other in the way they manage their knowledge base 
over time, i.e. depending on the nearness to scientific research, the transferability of 
knowledge, the size and growth of the market. They do not know for certain about 
the result of the different strategies to create and apply new knowledge. The result is 
a differential growth of firms, even in the same industry, and the foundations of new 
enterprises on the part of independent inventors, particularly in the case of major 
innovations, with that of changes of the market structure. Major innovations are 
complementary to minor ones (see Mokyr 1990, p. 297; Baumol 2002, p. 72). With 
bounded rationality firms prefer incremental instead of radical innovations. 
Correspondingly, the technical and the economic developments are characterized by 
periods of relative stability and of rapid change (see Basalla 1988, p. 25.).  
To sum up - following Penrose (1959, p. 24) - the firm may be seen as a bundle of 
productive physical and human resources, capable of development. They are 
combined into a bundle of performances, each one different and unique, by the 
firm’s management, its competences. These, in turn, determine the services of the 
resources. Corporate growth will result in surplus firm-specific resources, for which 
no market exists. They make possible an expansion on production in previous and in 
new business activities, which on their part again lead to innovation in knowledge 
and resources in enterprises. Management capacities of a firm increase 
endogenously in the course of internal corporate growth (ibid., p. 56; 85). So firms, 
in the form of their provision of the resources and the supply of services, show both   22
qualities of heterogeneity and coherence (in the words of Marshall: differentiation 
and integration). As individual types of resources, tangible, physical, also intangible, 
for instance human capital, technical, firm-specific knowledge and organizational 
resources are distinguished (see Barney 1991, p. 101). In contrast to tradable 
productive factors, resources are not completely movable, they are difficult to 
imitate and substitute or none at all.  
A differentiated provision with valuable scarce resources, which are not imitable, 
gives reason for both permanent (Ricardian) and short-term (Schumpeterian) rents, 
the latter out of innovations (see Peteraf 1993, p. 354; Peteraf, Barney 2003, pp. 
318). Firms, at the same time, have to appropriate the resulting rents and to convert 
them into internal growth. Due to different competences, not all of them will realize 
and exploit their available opportunities for manufacturing and innovation equally. 
The result again is a differentiated corporate growth. Altogether, the resource-based 
approach of management activities and entrepreneurial function assigns a more 
active, intentional role to firms than merely the adaptation to a given environment or 
its transformation compared to the strict Darwinian interpretation of evolutionary 
economics. In a dynamic view, firms must discern new opportunities on the markets 
by means of their search routines and for that also change their organizational 
structure. Over and above that, the provision with given resources has to be 
supplemented by their capability to enlarge and modify their resource base. “A 
dynamic capability is the capacity of an organisation to purposefully create, extend, 
or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007, p. 4). Dynamic capabilities also 
have to be developed inside an enterprise through processes of learning and different 
forms of knowledge strategies and cannot be acquired on factor markets. Both 
resource-based approaches remain within the framework of the behavioural theory 
of the firm. They both will explain why firms differ persistently, either as the result 
of differences in the given provision with valuable resources or in capabilities for the 
creation and employment of new resources and their learning activities. They are, as 
a further element besides Schumpeterian innovation activities and bounded 
rationality, to a large degree compatible with the principles of evolutionary 
economics (see Foss 1993, p. 132). The creation and exploitation of resources, such 
as new knowledge, with the separate step of learning, and their subsequent growth, 
the in this way triggered extension of the knowledge base describes a “ knowledge 
evolution cycle” (Zollo, Winter 2002, p. 343) of variation, selection and retention.
15 
In the course of time the new knowledge becomes more and more embedded in 
human behaviour (ibid., p. 344). 
                                                 
15  „…, the entrepreneur function in the dynamic capabilities framework is in part Schumpeterian 
(the entrepreneur introduces novelty and seeks new combinations) and in part evolutionary (the 
entrepreneur endeavours to promote and shape learning)” (Augier, Teece 2009, p. 418).    23
With regard to their resources and capabilities, firms, in their heterogeneity, are in 
their entirety both subject to external selection within their population and show 
intentionally also an internal development that regenerates new variety. They 
gradually and with delay adapt to the environment even if not always in an optimal 
manner. In the economy, evolution and intentional development, variation and 
transformation, go along with each other (see Witt 2005, p. 340, 354; Metcalfe 2005, 
p. 396). The internal development results from a internal and external learning 
processes, also the formation of competences and capabilities. Successful behaviour 
will be stored in the routines of a firm. The development of a firm - contrary to the 
selection process - does not show regularity to a great extent. Following Penrose, the 
growth of a firm, caused by the company’s competence and its learning and 
knowledge activities, is seen as a model of regularity in its internal development 
(critical see Witt 2005, p. 349). In general, an evolutionary theory of the firm 
includes the interaction between economic entities and their environment as well as 
among the entities inside an enterprise (see Foss 2001, pp. 332; Hodgson, Knudsen 
2004, p. 301). Finally, technical and economic evolution are both the result of the 
unintentional, natural market selection through competitive forces of the 
environment, and of the intentional, voluntary entrepreneurial choices, based on the 
firm’s resources and capabilities (see Vanberg 1996, p. 690; Spulber 2003, p. 256). 
5. Concluding Remarks 
There is an agreement to a large degree that the subject of evolutionary economics is 
a process of continuous economic change at different levels, caused by the 
emergence and dissemination of technical and organizational innovations and their 
consequences on the markets. But currently there is no common understanding 
regarding the explanation of evolutionary economic change. In a narrow 
interpretation it can be understood as a process of self-transformation of the 
economic system, historically with reference to Schumpeter and Marshall. In general 
agreement with the theoretically more comprehensive concept of Neo-Darwinian 
evolution in nature, it is, from an epistemological point of view, a knowledge-
creating and - exploiting process of variation and selection of heterogeneous 
individuals and organizations. For the purpose of economic reasoning the 
evolutionary mechanisms need to be specified compared with their meaning in 
biology, but also supplemented by new evolutionary forms like cooperation between 
economic entities and self-organization of the units of the economic system. Within 
this framework, evolution in economics and the natural world is interpreted either as 
one sphere of reality or as two from each other differentiated fields. 
Correspondingly, a generalized Darwinian and a neo-Schumpeterian interpretation   24
of neo-Darwinian founded evolutionary economics are suggested. They represent 
slightly different views about communalities between biology and economics. The 
emphasized differences say something for a dualistic approach of economic 
evolution. Pragmatically, in addition the latter version has until now the decisive 
advantage of an extensive application to traditional economic subjects, like, above 
all, the innovation activity of privately owned enterprises, moreover, firm behaviour 
and competition in the market and for the employment and extension of productive 
resources. Assuming bounded rationality, internal and external learning and 
knowledge exploration, exploitation and retention of the firms are of utmost 
importance for economic change. As an alternative pattern of theoretical explanation 
it has to prove worthwhile in these (and other) areas in comparison with the 
dominant equilibrium-and optimization-oriented neoclassical theory of economics. 
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